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Abstract
This paper conducts a Ramsey analysis within an endogenous growth cash-in-advance economy with policy commitment. Credit and money are alternative payment mechanisms that act as
inputs into the household production of exchange. The credit is produced with a diminishing returns technology with Inada conditions that implies along the balanced-growth path a degree one
homogeneity of effective banking time. This tightens the restrictions found within shopping time
economies while providing a production basis for the Ramsey-Friedman optimum that suggests a
special case of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
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Introduction

Homogeneity of the shopping time function in Correia and Teles (1999) is
necessary for Ramsey (1927) optimality of the Friedman (1969) rule. This
second-best Friedman optimum is an interesting result in that it occurs in one
of the most standard exchange economies in use today. However the required
homogeneity of the arguments in the shopping time function is diﬃcult to
interpret since this is a general transactions cost technology, involving the
input of the consumer’s shopping time as derived from some combination
of real money and consumption. One interpretation is supplied by Lucas
(2000). In specifying the shopping time model, he chooses a functional form
that makes shopping time inversely proportional to the consumption velocity
of real money demand (see also Canzoneri and Diba (2003)). This implies a
money demand interest elasticity of -0.5 as in Baumol (1952) and a unitary
income elasticity, while implying a shopping time function that is homogenous of degree one in real money and consumption goods. More generally,
Correia and Teles (1999) do not impose a unitary income elasticity of money
demand and find that any degree of homogeneity is suﬃcient for the Friedman
rule to be Ramsey optimal, although here the implications for the underlying
money demand function are not drawn out.
This paper contributes a diﬀerent approach that oﬀers a new derivation
and interpretation of the homogeneity result. Alternatively it can be viewed
as a more restrictive approach that focuses like Lucas (2000) on the resulting
money demand function. The model imposes restrictions on the transactions
technology by assuming that credit is produced with diminishing returns
to labor. It is assumed that exchange credit is produced using labor time
(or "banking time") and goods in a Cobb-Douglas fashion, where the credit
serves as a costly way to buy goods without using interest-foregoing money.
This results in a money demand function with an interest elasticity similar to Cagan’s in that it rises with the inflation rate; and it has a unitary
consumption elasticity.
The credit production specification also yields a restriction equivalent
to homogeneity of degree one on eﬀective time used in exchange in a way
that is comparable to a special case of a shopping time function. The credit
production specification is partly restricted by the need of its endogenous
growth setting to have all variables in the economy grow at the same rate on
the balanced—growth path (BGP) equilibrium. This means that money and
consumption must grow at the same rate, and consumption velocity must be
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stable, giving a unitary consumption elasticity of money demand. This in
turn restricts the homogeneity on the time spent in transactions.
The key necessary condition for Ramsey (1927) optimality of the Friedman rule is that the marginal productivity of the banking time in producing
credit must be driven to infinity. At this point, with only an assumption of
diminishing returns in producing credit per unit of consumption, credit production is indeed zero and only money is used by the consumer for exchange.
In contrast, the Ramsey (1927) optimality condition within the shopping
time economy requires that there is "satiation" of real money balances so
that there is no use of shopping time required once this particular satiation
level of money demand is reached. This also involves the additional assumption that the change in shopping time with respect to money is equal to
zero at that point, a diﬀerentiability required for the Ramsey optimum. The
banking time model instead substitutes zero credit use for the satiation point
and substitutes a diminishing marginal product of labor in credit production
with Inada conditions for the diﬀerentiability of the shopping time function.
The resulting Ramsey (1927) optimality of the Friedman (1969) optimum
can be interpreted as a special case of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971): credit is
specified as an alternative input into producing exchange, along with money,
making it an intermediate good within a Becker (1975) household production
economy. The consumer needs not only the good, but also the exchange
means to get the good, either money or credit.1 This is why the shadow
price of consumption contains a shadow goods cost component (one) plus a
shadow exchange cost component (a weighted average of the cost of using
cash and of using credit). The shadow costs reflect a Becker (1975)- like
interpretation of money and credit as inputs, and this provides the secondbest intuition: intermediate goods with CRS production functions are not to
be taxed because it distorts the production margins (the input allocations) as
well as the consumption margins (goods versus leisure), as long as the goods
output is also CRS produced (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971). The RamseyDiamond-Mirrlees result in the economy implies that money as an input to
exchange should not be taxed when other taxes are available that do not
distort the exchange production margin; otherwise the eﬃcient production
of exchange is needlessly distorted towards wasteful inflation-tax avoiding
credit use. Zero credit production is second-best optimal because it avoids
unnecessary distortions to production eﬃciency.
1

The framework is developed in Gillman and Kejak (2005).

http://www.bepress.com/bejm/topics/vol5/iss1/art16

2

Gillman and Yerokhin: Ramsey-Friedman Optimality with Banking Time

2
2.1

The "Banking Time" Economy
The Consumer Problem

The representative consumer’s time period t utility function depends on consumption goods and leisure, and is given by u(ct , xt ), with the assumed Inada
conditions with respect to ct and xt . Discounted by the time preference rate
ρ ∈ (0, 1) the utility stream is
Z ∞
e−ρt u(ct , xt )dt.
(1)
0

The consumer divides an endowment of 1 unit of time between working
to produce goods output, lt , working to produce credit, ldt , investing in human capital production, lht , and taking leisure, xt . The allocation of time
constraint can be written as
1 = lt + ldt + lht + xt .
2.1.1

(2)

Production Technology

Consumption with Goods and Exchange Consider a Becker (1975)type household production economy as extended to include exchange activity as part of household production, and also including human capital
(Lucas 1988). The consumer engages in household production of exchange,
using money and credit, and of the consumption good using goods output
and exchange. The good that the agent consumes is the aggregate consumption good, denoted ct . This is produced using the aggregate output yt that is
devoted to consumption goods, denoted by yct , and an amount of exchange
that is needed to purchase the good, denoted by yet . Note here that only consumption goods are assumed to require exchange; capital and labor markets
do not require exchange. Let the production of the consumption good be
Leontieﬀ in terms of the goods output and the exchange. Whereas Aiyagari,
Braun, and Eckstein (1998) use a Leontieﬀ technology to produce the credit
good at each store of a continuum of stores, here the approach is extended
by having an aggregate good combined with exchange, either cash or credit,
in Leontieﬀ fashion to produce the Becker (1975)-type consumption good:
ct = min(yct , yet ).
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Only the eﬃcient frontier of the Leontieﬀ production of the consumption
good will be utilized, this being a ray from the origin in isoquant space, if
the relative price of the output of goods to the exchange means for goods is
between zero and infinity. Here the assumption is that the slope is one. This
means simply that the amount of goods bought corresponds directly to the
amount of money or credit paid for the goods, in a one-to-one fashion.2 This
implies that along the ray
ct = yct ;
ct = yet.

(4)
(5)

The production of output yt is a standard constant returns to scale function in capital, kt , and eﬀective labor, the human capital, ht , factored by the
labor supply, lt :
yt = f (kt , lt ht ) = Aktα (lt ht )1−α .
(6)
The production of human capital is given by the function H(·) that has
as its only argument lht :
ḣt = ht H(lht ).
(7)
It is assumed that H 0 (lht ) > 0, and H 00 (lht ) < 0.
The production of exchange requires inputs of real money balances and/or
real credit. Denote the real money balances as mt ≡ Mt /Pt , with Mt denoting the nominal money stock, and Pt denoting the price of the aggregate
consumption good. And let real credit be denoted by dt . The production
of exchange is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in mt and dt . In
general it given as
yet = fe (mt , dt ).
(8)
Specifically, assume that real money and credit are perfect substitutes, so
that
(9)
yet = mt + dt .
Credit The credit technology is a costly self-produced means of purchasing
goods instead of using money. This might be thought of as an abstraction
from a world with payment uncertainty, where for example, the agent produces information about his purchase and payment history that enables credit
2

In Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998) the ray is assumed to have a slope not necessarily equal to one; this is crucial for their imposition in equilibrium of an exogenous
money demand function.
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to be issued just as a credit agency might. Here there is not a decentralized
credit market, but rather the representative agent simply acts in part as a
bank, producing what can be called exchange credit.3
The specification is that the eﬀective labor per unit of consumption produces the share of credit in total purchases with a diminishing marginal productivity. In particular, from equations (4), (5), and (9), dt /ct = 1−(mt /ct ) .
Define the share
at ≡ mt /ct .
(10)
Then dt = ct (1 − at ) is the total credit used. Specify the production of this
credit, with γ ∈ (0, 1), as
,
dt = ct Adt (ldt ht /ct )γ = Ad (ldt ht )γ c1−γ
t

(11)

or in terms of the share at :
1 − at = Ad (ldt ht /ct )γ

(12)

The diminishing returns technology implies that the marginal cost per
unit of consumption is an upward sloping curve that depends on the parameter γ. This marginal cost (MCt ) can be defined as the marginal factor cost
divided by the marginal factor product, or, with wt denoting the marginal la−1/γ
bor cost, MCt ≡ (wt /γ)Ad (dt /ct )(1−γ)/γ (this definition instead can be derived from the BGP equilibrium conditions below, as in equation (49), where
Rt = MCt ). With γ = 0.5, this marginal cost curve slopes upward with a
straight line; with γ < 0.5 it exhibits an upward sloping convex marginal
cost curve that entails an increasing marginal cost as output of credit per
unit of consumption increases. This (0, 0.5) range is the most plausible for
γ since it produces the typically shaped marginal cost curve; for the (0.5, 1)
range the marginal costs rise at a decreasing rate.
2.1.2

Total Income

The consumer buys and sells nominal government bonds, denoted by Bt ,
which earn the nominal interest rate of Rt . The change over time in the real
bond purchases is Ḃt /Pt and the real value of the interest is Rt Bt /Pt . This
net purchase of bonds, plus the consumer’s real goods purchases yct , equal to
ct by equation (4), plus the capital investment, denoted by k̇t , and investment
3

It is a Hicks (1935) suggestion to have the agent "act in part as a bank".
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in real money Ṁt /Pt are equal to the after tax return to labor and capital
rentals plus the bond income. With wt and rt denoting the rental prices of
labor and capital, denote the after tax real wage and interest rental rates as
w
et ≡ (1 − τ lt )wt ,
ret ≡ (1 − τ kt )rt .

(13)
(14)

ct + k̇t + Ṁt /Pt + Ḃt /Pt = w
et lt ht + ret kt + Rt Bt /Pt .

(15)

Ṁt /Pt = ṁt + mt π t ,

(16)

The consumer budget constraint is

The money investment can be written as

and inserted into equation (15) to give
ct + k̇t + ṁt + mt π t + Ḃt /Pt = w
et lt ht + ret kt + Rt Bt /Pt .

(17)

Rt = π t + ret .

(18)

The consumer problem could now be stated in a Hamiltonian form (see
for example Turnovsky (1997)) as the maximization of utility (1) subject to
the allocation of time constraint (2), the human capital investment constraint
(7), the income constraint (17) and the money and credit constraints (10),
(11) and (12). The choice variables would be mt , dt , and at plus all of the
time allocations, the goods consumption, and the physical and human capital
levels. A reduced set of constraints results by eliminating at by combining the
money and credit constraints into one constraint of ct = dt + mt . The credit
output dt can be eliminated by substituting in from the credit technology
equation (11) so that the constraints are now ct Ad (ldt ht /ct )γ = ct + mt , plus
the human capital investment, allocation of time, and income constraints. A
further reduced set of constraints, of human capital investment, allocation of
time, and income, can result by eliminating the banking time ldt by solving
for it in terms of ct, mt , and ht and substituting this into the allocation of
time constraint (see equation (31) below).
Note that in the Hamiltonian, diﬀerentiating with respect to the physical
capital level and the nominal bond level Bt , yields the Fisher equation

This gets suppressed when using the wealth constraint approach below with
Ricardian equivalence.

http://www.bepress.com/bejm/topics/vol5/iss1/art16
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2.2

The Goods Producer Problem

The goods producer rents labor and capital from the consumer, taking the
competitive real prices of labor and capital as given. The firm’s first-order
conditions, using equation (6), are
¶α
µ
kt
wt = (1 − α)
= flh (kt , lt ht ),
(19)
lt ht
¶α−1
µ
kt
rt = α
= fk (kt , lt ht ),
(20)
lt ht
and the CRS production function implies that there are zero profits.

2.3

Government Budget Constraint

The government has no access to lump sum taxes and finances its expenditure gt partly with flat proportional taxes on labor and capital income.
With these tax rates at time t denoted by τ lt and τ kt , this real tax income
k
l
is
³ τ t rt kt + τ´t wt lt ht . Added to this is the net proceeds of new bond issues
Ḃt − Rt Bt /Pt , and proceeds from new money printing (Mt+1 − Mt )/Pt ,
where the nominal money supply is assumed to exogenously grow at a constant rate σ through open market operations, and where the consumer is
already given the initial stock M0 > 0. The government budget constraint is
given by
´
³
k
l
(21)
τ t rt kt + τ t wt lt ht + Ḃt − Rt Bt /Pt + Ṁt /Pt = gt .

2.4

Resource Constraint

Writing out the consumer’s income constraint (17) by using that w
et ≡ (1 −
l
k
τ t )wt , and ret ≡ (1 − τ t )rt (equations 13 and 14), so that
ct + k̇t + Ṁt /Pt + Ḃt /Pt = (1 − τ lt )wt lt ht + (1 − τ kt )rt kt + Rt Bt /Pt ,

and substituting in for τ kt rt kt + τ lt wt lt ht from the government budget constraint (21), gives that
ct + k̇t + gt = wt lt ht + rt kt .

Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
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Using the CRS property of goods production, whereby
wt lt ht + rt kt = Aktα (lt ht )1−α ,
this then reduces to the resource constraint of
ct + k̇t + gt = Aktα (lt ht )1−α .

3
3.1

(22)

Equilibrium
The Wealth Constraint

A formulation convenient for the Ramsey (1927) problem is to construct the
wealth constraint from the income flow constraint (17). Define real wealth,
denoted as Wt , by the sum of physical capital and the real money stock:
Wt = kt + mt + Bt /Pt .

(23)

Then from equations (17), (23), and using the Fisher identity in (18) that
Rt = π t + ret , it follows that
et ht lt − ct − Rt mt .
Ẇt = ret (kt + mt + Bt /Pt ) + w

(24)

Note that it is assumed that Rt ≥ 0 so that the wealth constraint is not
unbounded (see for example Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000)).
Given the initial period m0 and k0 , integrating over the infinite horizon,
and imposing the transversality conditions,
R
− 0t r
es ds

lim mt e

t→∞

lim kt e−

t→∞

Rt
0

res ds

lim (Bt /Pt ) e−

t→∞

Rt
0

= 0;

(25)

= 0;

(26)

res ds

= 0;

the wealth constraint (see Appendix A.1) is
Z ∞ − R t re ds
0 s
e
[ct + Rt mt − w
et ht lt ]dt = m0 + k0 + B0 /P0 .

(27)

(28)

0

Constraint (28) is a dynamic version of the income constraint of Mulligan
and Sala-I-Martin (1997) (see equation 2, p.7).
The consumer problem can be stated as the maximization of utility (equation 1) subject to equations (2), (7), (10), (12) and (28), the allocation of
time, human capital investment, money, credit and wealth constraints, with
respect to ct , xt , lt , lht , ldt , at , mt , kt , and ht .

http://www.bepress.com/bejm/topics/vol5/iss1/art16
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3.2

Definition of Equilibrium

The competitive equilibrium consists of a time path for the allocation {yct ,
∞
yet , dt , ct , xt , lt , lht , ldt , mt , kt , ht }∞
t=0 given the input prices {wt , rt }t=0 , tax
∞
rates {τ lt , τ kt }∞
t=0 , government spending {gt }t=0 , and the initial period k0 , M0 ,
B0 and P0 (normalized to one), such that {ct , xt , lt , lht , mt , kt , ht , Bt /Pt }∞
t=0
maximizes (1) subject to constraints (2), (7), (10), (12) and (28), and such
∞
that {τ lt , τ kt }∞
t=0 and {kt , lt , ht , rt , wt }t=0 satisfy the constraints (6), (19),
(20), (21) and (22), and that constraints (4), (5), (9), and (11) are satisfied.

3.3

Characterization of Equilibrium

The eﬀective labor in credit production, which in equilibrium can be thought
of as the derived demand, can be solved from equations (10) and (12) as
ldt ht = (Ad )−1/γ ct [1 − (mt /ct )]1/γ .

(29)

Equation (29) is mathematically analogous to a special case of the McCallum
and Goodfriend (1987) shopping time economy (Walsh 1998) as extended to
endogenous growth. But here instead the concept is banking time that is used
to produce an intermediate good, credit, that in turn is combined with money
to produce another intermediate good, exchange, which finally is combined
in Leontieﬀ fashion with goods output to produce consumption goods.
Solving for ldt and defining it as b(ct , mt , ht ),
³
´
−1/γ
1/γ
ldt = Ad ct [1 − (mt /ct )]
(30)
/ht ≡ b(ct , mt , ht ),

where bc > 0, bm < 0, bh < 0, this raw banking time can be substituted
directly into the allocation of time constraint (2):
1 = lt + b(ct , mt , ht ) + lht + xt ,

(31)

while ldt ht is the eﬀective banking time. The function b(ct , mt , ht ) of equation
(30) exhibits homogeneity of degree one in ct and mt as in equation (29), and
exhibits homogeneity of degree zero (HD0) in its three arguments.
The present value Hamiltonian for the consumer problem can then be
written as
H = e−ρt u(ct , xt ) + µt ht H(lht ) + θt [1 − xt − b(ct , mt , ht ) − lt − lht ]
·
¸
Z ∞ R
− 0t res ds
+λ m0 + k0 + B0 /P0 +
e
(w
et ht lt − ct − Rt mt ) dt (.32)
0
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9

Topics in Macroeconomics , Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 16

The first-order conditions are
e−ρt uc (ct , xt ) − λe−

−λe−

Rt
0

res ds

− θt bc (ct , mt , ht ) = 0;

(33)

e−ρt ux (ct , xt ) − θt = 0;

(34)

λe−

(35)

Rt
0

Rt
0

res ds

w
et ht − θt = 0;

µt ht H 0 (lht ) − θt = 0;
res ds

µt H(lht ) + λe−

Rt
0

Rt − θt bm (ct , mt , ht ) = 0;

res ds

(36)
(37)

w
et lt − θt bh (ct , mt , ht ) = −µ̇t .

(38)

w
et [lt − hs bh (ct , mt , ht )] = −µ̇t ;

(39)

Combining equations (35) and (38) to get
µt H(lht ) + λe−

Rt
0

res ds

multiplying through by ht and substituting in equation (7) gives
µ̇t ht + µt ḣt = −λe−

Rt
0

This can be written as

res ds

w
et ht [lt − hs bh (ct , mt , ht )].

Rs
d
(µs hs ) = −λe− 0 reξ dξ w
es hs [ls − hs bh (cs , ms , hs )].
ds

(40)

(41)

Integrating both sides from t to ∞ and imposing the transversality condition
lim µs hs = 0,

s→∞

(42)

gives that
−

µt ht = λe

Rt
0

reξ dξ

Z

t

∞

e−

Rs
t

reξ dξ

w
es hs [ls − hs bh (cs , ms , hs )].

(43)

Substituting in equations (35) and (36), and using the fact that

−ht bh (ct , mt , ht ) = bc (ct , mt , ht )ct + bm (ct , mt , ht )mt = b(ct , mt , ht ),

(44)

gives the Becker (1975)-type [p. 68, equation (63)] margin of human capital
accumulation, stated as
Z ∞ R
s
0
w
et ht = H (lht )
e− t reξ dξ w
es hs [ls + b(cs , ms , hs )]ds.
(45)
t

http://www.bepress.com/bejm/topics/vol5/iss1/art16
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Equation (45) is the Euler equation for the motion of human capital in the
economy with banking time. The left-hand side is the workers earnings if
a unit of time is spent in the production of goods. The right-hand side
is the product of two terms: the percentage increase in human capital if
a unit of time is spent in human capital accumulation, and the discounted
value of increased earnings flow that this additional human capital will yield.
Alternatively this condition can be written as
µ R
¶
Z ∞ R
−ρt
− 0t reξ dξ 0
− ts reξ dξ
e ux (ct , xt ) = λ e
H (lht )
e
w
es hs [ls + b(cs , ms , hs )]ds ,
t

(46)
defining the margin of leisure time versus time spent in human capital accumulation. The left-hand side is the utility value of a unit of time devoted to
leisure in period t from the point of view of period 0. The right-hand side is
the same value of time in human capital accumulation as in equation (45),
now discounted back to period zero and converted to its utility value through
multiplication by the shadow value of wealth.
From equations (33) and (35), the intertemporal consumption marginal
rate of substitution between dates 0 and t is
Rt

e−ρt uc (ct , xt )
et ht bc (ct , mt , ht )]
e− 0 res ds [1 + w
=
.
uc (c0 , x0 )
1+w
e0 h0 bc (c0 , m0 , h0 , B0 /P0 )

(47)

Equations (33), (34) and (35) imply that the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure is
uc (ct , xt )
1+w
et ht bc (ct , mt , ht )
=
,
ux (ct , xt )
w
et ht

(48)

being equal to the ratio of the shadow prices of consumption and leisure, comparable to, for example, Walsh’s (1998) shopping time model, where 1 is the
goods cost and w
et ht bc (ct , mt , ht ) the exchange cost. Since w
et ht bc (ct , mt , ht ) <
∞, there is a solution at the corner of the square Leontieﬀ isoquant in equation (3). In particular, the slope along the Leontieﬀ isoquant is either zero
or infinity. Thus if there is a relative cost of goods versus exchange which is
between zero and infinity, then this guarantees that the slope of the isocost
line is between zero and infinity and touches the isoquant at its corner. Here
being in a "corner" is good. It produces an interior solution that guarantees
that the consumer indeed chooses to combine an equal amount of goods and
exchange in order to "produce" the consumption good from these two inputs.

Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
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Also note the alternative interpretation of the shadow exchange cost of
goods, w
et ht bc . It can be shown that in equilibrium w
et ht bc = at Rt +(1−at )γRt .
The term at Rt + (1 − at )γRt is a weighted average of the average costs of
money and credit. The average cost of credit γRt is less than the average
cost of money Rt since γ < 1. This means that although the marginal cost
of credit is equal to Rt in equilibrium, its average cost is less and so the
consumer saves by using credit.
To see that the marginal cost of credit is equal to the nominal interest
rate, use equations (35) and (37) to write
w
et ht bm = Rt .

(49)

This is the analogue to the original equilibrium condition in Baumol (1952)
from minimizing the costs of using money or going to the bank. The condition (49) similarly equalizes the marginal cost of the alternative exchange
means. This follows by using equations (10), (11), (12) and (30) to show that
et ht bm = w
et ht / [∂dt /∂(ldt )] . This latter term is
bm = 1/ [∂dt /∂(ldt )] , so that w
the marginal factor cost divided by the marginal factor product, which by
microeconomic theory is equal to the marginal cost of the output dt . This
relation implies that Rt is equal to the marginal cost of credit.

3.4

Money and Banking

The condition (49) that equalizes the marginal costs of exchange, along with
equations (10) (11), and (12), also yields the solution for at , the money
demand function, and the consumption velocity:
1/γ

et ht bm (ct , mt , ht ) = w
et Ad [1 − (mt /ct )](1/γ)−1 /γ;
Rt = w
h
i
1/(1−γ)
(Rt γ/w
et )γ/(1−γ) ;
at = 1 − Ad
³
h
i´
1/(1−γ)
(Rt γ/w
et )γ/(1−γ) .
mt = ct 1 − Ad

(50)
(51)
(52)

et Ad )]γ/(1−γ) }; it is
The consumption velocity is ct /mt = 1/{1 − [(Rt γ)/(w
constant on the balanced-growth
´α This results because the wage rate
³ path.
kt
of eﬀective labor, wt = (1 − α) lt ht , depends on the capital to eﬀective
labor ratio; kt and ht grow at the same rate on the balanced-growth path,
and the labor share lt is constant on the balanced-growth path. Since w
et ≡
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(1−τ lt )wt , and given that the labor and capital tax rates are also constant on
the balanced-growth path, so w
et is also constant. With ret constant as well,
the nominal interest rate is constant on the balanced-growth path, and so is
the consumption velocity. This also gives a unitary consumption elasticity.
The banking time is also constant on the balanced-growth path. From
−1/γ
equation (30), ldt = Ad (ct /ht ) [1 − (mt /ct )]1/γ . With ct and ht growing at
the same rate on the balanced-growth path, and with mt /ct also constant,
so is the banking time. These balanced-growth conditions also make the
banking time homogeneous of degree one with respect to mt and ct .
The interest elasticity of mt /ct , or of the money demand normalized by
R
consumption, is denoted by η R
a , and given by η a = −[γ/(1−γ)](1−at )/at . As
the interest rises, the credit to cash ratio, (1−at )/at , rises and the normalized
2
interest elasticity becomes more negative: ∂η R
a /∂Rt = −Rt [γ/(1 − γ)] (1 −
at )/(at )2 < 0. Its increasing elasticity with inflation is similar to that in the
Cagan (1956) model. Or another way to see the interest elasticity is to write
it in terms of the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs money
and credit,
by ε. Following
¶¸ ·µGillman ¶and³ Kejak´¸(2005), define this
· ³denoted
´ µ
ac
R
R
ac
/ (1−a)c
as ≡ ∂ (1−a)c
/∂
, which is solved
1/γ
1/γ
w
et /γAd

w
et /γAd
− γ)]/a. Then with η R
m denoting the
(not normalized) and η R
c denoting the

as = −[γ/(1
interest elasticity of
money demand
interest elasticity of
consumption, the interest elasticity of money can be written as a sum of the
share of the substitute factor, credit, factored by the elasticity of substitution
between money and credit, plus a scale eﬀect:
R
ηR
m = (1 − a) + η c .

(53)

And at R = 0, the interest elasticity is zero since by equation (49) ld = 0 and
et ld h/c)/(1 + w
et ld h/c) = 0 and the share of credit is zero.
ηR
c = [1/(1 − γ)] (w
As the nominal interest rate rises from zero the interest elasticity gradually
rises in magnitude from zero.

4

The Ramsey Optimum

Here the primal approach to optimal taxation (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2000)
is used to express time t prices in terms of allocations (see Appendix A.2).
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From equations (34), (35), and (37)
w
et ht =

ux (ct , xt )
.
uc (ct , xt ) − ux (ct , xt )bc (ct , mt , ht )

(54)

Equations (33), (34) and (37) imply that
Rt =

ux (ct , xt )bm (ct , mt , ht )
.
ux (ct , xt )bc (ct , mt , ht ) − uc (ct , xt )

(55)

From equations (34) and (35), and given that λ is constant for all t, it follows
e0 h0 , and that, with equations (33) and (34),
that λ = ux (c0 , x0 )/w
e−

Rt
0

res ds

=

w
e0 h0
e−ρt [uc (ct , xt ) − ux (ct , xt )bc (ct , mt , ht )].
ux (c0 , x0 )

(56)

Assuming that τ k0 = τ l0 = 0, and using equations (19) and (20), this expression can be written as
e−

Rt
0

fk (ks ,ls hs )ds

=

flh (k0 , l0 h0 )h0 −ρt
e [uc (ct , xt ) − ux (ct , xt )bc (ct , mt , ht )] (57)
ux (c0 , x0 )

Substituting equations (54), (55) and (57) into equations (28) and (46),
and using the homogeneity properties of credit time function as given in
equation (30), the implementability constraints can be derived as
Z ∞
ux (c0 , x0 )[k0 + m0 ]
=
e−ρt {uc (ct , xt )ct − ux (ct , xt )[lt + b(ct , mt , ht )]} dt,
flh (k0 , l0 h0 )h0
0
(58)
Z ∞
ux (ct , xt ) = H 0 (lht )
e−ρ(s−t) ux (cs , xs )[ls + b(cs , ms , hs )]ds.
(59)
t

Equation (58) is the consumer’s budget constraint with prices expressed
in terms of allocations. The use of human capital accumulation constraint
(59) is motivated by the fact that human capital accumulation occurs outside
of the market and cannot be taxed. There is no tax instrument that can
be used to make this Euler equation hold for an arbitrary allocation, and
consequently it constitutes a constraint on the set of competitive allocations.
One way to approach this problem was suggested by Jones, Manuelli, and
Rossi (1997), who solve for the Ramsey (1927) plan without including this
constraint and then check to see if it is satisfied by the first-order conditions
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to the planner’s problem in the steady-state (see also Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2000)). Alternatively, here the constraint is included in the maximization
problem explicitly.
The Ramsey (1927) problem can be formulated as the social planner’s
maximization of the representative agent’s utility (1) subject to the implementability constraints (58), (59) and the goods and time resource constraints. The goods resource constraint (22) can be combined with the time
constraint (31) to give
Aktα ([1 − xt − lht − b(cs , ms , hs )]ht )1−α − ct − k̇t − gt = 0.
This gives the Ramsey problem of
Z ∞
Max
H=
u(ct , xt )dt
ct ,xt ,mt ,lt ,lht ,ht ,kt

(60)

(61)

0

+ϕt {Aktα ([1 − xt − lht − b(ct , mt , ht )]ht )1−α − ct − kt· − gt }
µ
ux (c0 , x0 )[k0 + m0 + B0 /P0 ]
+Φ
−
flh (k0 , l0 h0 )h0
¶
Z ∞
−ρt
e {uc (ct , xt )ct − ux (ct , xt )[lt + b(ct , mt , ht )]}dt
0
µ
¶
Z ∞
0
−ρ(s−t)
e
ux (cs , xs )[ls + b(cs , ms , hs )]ds .
+Λt ux (ct , xt ) − H (lht )
t

Lemma 1 With positive resources, the optimum monetary policy in the endogenous growth economy with a “banking time” specification of the transaction costs function, is satisfied only if
bm (ct , mt , ht ) = 0.

(62)

proof. The first-order condition of the problem in equation (61) with
respect to mt is
bm (ct , mt , ht ){−ϕt flh (kt , lt ht )ht + [Φe−ρt − ΛH 0 (lht )]ux (ct , xt )} = 0.

(63)

The first-order condition with respect to lt is
[Φe−ρt − ΛH 0 (lht )]ux (ct , xt ) = 0,
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which can be substituted into equation (63) to give that
(65)

bm (ct , mt , ht )ϕt flh (kt , lt ht )ht = 0.
Case 1. Suppose that bm (cs , ms , hs ) 6= 0. Then it would be true that
ϕt flh (kt , lt ht )ht = 0.

(66)

By equation (19) and the facts that labor and capital are limited, that kt and
ht are growing at the balanced path growth rate, and that ct > 0 because of
Inada conditions on the utility function, so that lt must be positive, it follows
that flh (kt , lt ht ) > 0 and ht >0. And the shadow price of the real resource
constraint must be positive since there are positive resources, as in equation
(2), and insatiable utility, so that ϕt > 0. Thus this leads to a contradiction.
Case 2. bm (cs , ms , hs ) = 0. Equation (30) implies that bm = Ast ct (1/γ)[1−
(mt /ct )](1/γ)−1 /ht . With γ ∈ (0, 1), this case is satisfied when mt /ct = at = 1,
which is feasible.
Corollary 1 The Friedman rule of Rt = 0 holds at the Ramsey optimum.
proof. By Lemma 1 bm (cs , ms , hs ) = 0. This can be written as bm =
−b/[(1 − at )ct γ] = 0. And since (1 − at )ct = dt by equation (11), and
b(cs , ms , hs ) = ldt , then by equation (30), bm = −1/(∂dt /∂ldt ) = 0. This is the
(negative) inverse of the marginal product of labor in the credit production.
The Inada condition on credit production, lim ∂dt /∂ldt = ∞, applies to equaldt →0

tion (30) and so implies the satisfaction of the condition bm (cs , ms , hs ) = 0
at ldt = 0. With no labor in credit production, there is zero credit produced,
and this implies by equation (5), (9), (10), and (11) that at = 1. In turn
at = 1 implies by equations (10) and (50) that Rt = 0.
At the Friedman (1969) optimum, the amount of credit services provided
(and inflation-tax avoidance) is zero. This in turn implies that Friedman
optimum is part of the Ramsey (1927) optimal solution.

5

Discussion

In order for the Friedman (1969) rule to be Ramsey (1927) optimal the
production of credit must show diminishing returns in terms of the labor
input into the credit production function, or, of the banking time. The
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Inada conditions allow the marginal product to go to infinity as the labor
time goes to zero.
The result is not sensitive to non-extreme values of the parameters of the
variable cost credit technology. Extreme values of γ and Ad present corner
solutions and equilibrium uniqueness problems. If the diminishing returns
parameter is given by γ = 1, then the credit has a constant marginal cost
equal to its average cost, and this would be equivalent to a linear production
of credit with Ad equal to the constant marginal product of labor. Then
there may be no unique equilibrium. If the nominal interest rate coincides
with the marginal cost of credit, so that Rt = wt /Ad , then the consumer’s
equilibrium choice between money and credit is arbitrary. If Rt < wt /Ad ,
then the consumer uses only money; and if Rt > wt /Ad , the consumer uses
only credit and nominal prices are not well-defined. The Friedman (1969) rule
would still be first best in these cases, since it would save on resources used
in exchange (except when Ad = ∞ and credit is free of use as implicitly is
the case in Lucas and Stokey (1983)). But if Ad is near zero in the CRS case,
it is similar to making credit prohibitively expensive so that the economy is
similar to the cash-only Lucas (1980) model. With no viable substitutes to
money, the inflation tax then only distorts the consumption margin of goods
to leisure and is no worse than a value-added tax on goods purchases.
Money demand is aﬀected by γ and Ad in terms of how interest elastic
it is. The eﬀect of γ on the interest elasticity is ambiguous in general, while
a higher Ad unambiguously makes the money demand more interest elastic
at all inflation rates. Regardless of the particular non-extreme values of γ
and Ad , the money demand still exhibits an increasing interest elasticity as
the inflation rate rises, as in Cagan (1956), and as is critical in explaining
a certain nonlinearity in the inflation-growth eﬀect of the model and as in
evidence (Gillman and Kejak 2005). But the diﬀerent non-extreme γ and Ad
values do not aﬀect the Ramsey (1927) analysis.

6

Conclusion

The paper derives optimal monetary policy with commitment in an endogenous growth economy using an approach based on a price-theoretic description of money and credit. More explicit than the shopping time model in
these connections, the consumer uses both credit and money as intermediate goods in producing the household consumption good. The production
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of credit allows us to relate the conditions for optimality of the Friedman
(1969) rule to the underlying credit production technology. The optimality
conditions are related directly to conditions for balanced growth (see also
Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2002)); the consumption velocity of credit
must also be constant on the balanced-growth path. Shifts in the parameters determining the credit velocity, such as in the productivity of credit
during financial deregulation, can shift the credit velocity but do not aﬀect
the Ramsey analysis.
The paper gives new intuition to the homogeneity assumption for Ramsey
(1927) optimality of the Friedman (1969) rule. Credit use is zero in the
optimum and the marginal productivity of credit is infinite at this point,
although this is productivity only in avoiding the inflation tax. This bases
the proof of the Friedman rule as Ramsey optimal upon the Inada conditions
on the production function of credit while giving the intuition that there is
no proclivity of the consumer to substitute towards credit at this point, since
the interest elasticity of money demand is zero at the optimum.
The money demand implied by the credit technology has been supported
with empirical evidence (see (Mark and Sul 2002) and (Gillman and Otto
2002)) and is consistent with facets of the inflation experience along the
balanced-growth path that also have empirical support (Gillman and Kejak
2005), (Gillman, Harris, and Matyas 2004), (Gillman and Nakov 2003).4 This
consistency strengthens the paper’s intuition.

A
A.1

Appendix: Derivation of Equations
Wealth Constraint (28)

From equation (17), add and subtract rt mt to the RHS and solve for k̇t + ṁt .
With the Fisher Requation of interest rates this gives equation (24). Multiply
t
both sides by e− 0 res ds and integrate both sides over the infinite horizon:
e−

4

Rt
0

res ds

[Wt· − ret Wt ]dt = e−

Rt
0

res ds

[ct + Rt mt − w
et ht lt ]dt.

(67)

See also Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998) and Eckstein and Leiderman (1992)
who use a Cagan money demand to explain banking and seignoirage respectively.
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The LHS of this equation can be written as
Z ∞
Rt
Rt
R0
(e− 0 res ds Wt )dt = lim (e− 0 res ds Wt ) − e− 0 res ds W0
t→∞

0

= lim e−
t→∞

Rt

res ds

0

mt + lim e−
t→∞

Rt
0

res ds

(68)

kt − (k0 + m0 + B0 /P0 ).

Imposing the transversality conditions (25) and (26) gives the wealth constraint (28).

A.2

Implementability Conditions

Equations (33), (34) and (35) imply that
e−ρt ux (t)
,
e−ρt [uc (t) − ux (t)bc (t)]

wt ht =

(69)

which gives the equation (54).
Equation (34), (35), and (37) imply equation (55).
Equation (33), (34) and (36) imply that
e−ρt ux (t)

λ=

e−
At time 0,the constant λ is given by
λ=

Rt
0

res ds

wt ht

.

ux (0)
.
w0 h0

(70)

(71)

This implies equation (56):
e−

Rt
0

res ds

=

w0 h0 −ρt
e [uc (t) − ux (t)bc (t)].
ux (0)

(72)

To get equation (59), take equation (45) and substitute
in for prices
from the
R
R
− ts reξ dξ
− st reξ dξ −1
= (e
) .Then
from equations (54), (55), and (57). Also note that e
from equation (56),
e−

Rs
t

reξ dξ

= (e−

and this gives that

Rt
s

reξ dξ −1

)

ux (t)
= H 0 (lht )
uc (t) − ux (t)bc (t)

Z

t

And this implies equation (59).

=

∞

{

1
ux (s) −(s−t)ρ
;
e
ws hs
uc (t) − ux (t)bc (t)

(73)

ux (s) −ρ(s−t) ws hs [ls + bs ]
e
}ds.
ws hs
uc (t) − ux (t)bc (t)

(74)
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